Two agents have to collectively select one of two options. They are endowed with a personal bias, each in favor of a different option, and they observe a private signal with known quality. They then need to reveal their private signal to the other agent, but may decide to withhold some of the evidence the private signal provides, in order to persuade the other agent in the direction of their own bias. We present a Bayesian model capturing this form of persuasion. The model applies to a variety of phenomena, including political discussions, settlement negotiations and trade.
Introduction
People routinely try to persuade each other about their respective political views, future market trends, the quality of goods for sale, the outcome of adjudication, the abilities of a baseball coach, and many other serious or trivial topics. Yet, while trying to persuade another, one also tries to grasp useful information from the other's statements. While attempting to convince the seller that a good is of low value (and hence that the price should be low), a buyer will also typically try to infer whether the seller's claim that the good is in fact of high value (and hence the price should be high) is accurate. Stubbornly sticking to one's prior and therefore foregoing a good deal is a naive strategy. If the good is indeed of high quality, the buyer is better off paying a high price and going through with the transaction rather than leaving the good to someone else.
Similarly, a voter may want to convince her friend to choose a candidate that seems particularly close to her preferences but, while doing so, she may also want to revise her assessment of the candidate if her friend brings convincing arguments in favor of an alternative candidate.
In this paper, we refer to these and similar scenarios as mutual persuasion. We introduce a Bayesian model that allows us to predict if information exchange will result in persuasion and, if so, whether persuasion will be unidirectional (with a persuading b or vice versa) or bidirectional (with a persuading b and b persuading a). We show that bidirectional persuasion is indeed a possible outcome of information exchange, so that both parties might leave the conversation having reversed their opinions. In some contexts, this might be a desirable outcome. Think of a plaintiff and a defendant engaged in settlement negotiations: a reversal of opinions will lead them to settle the case for some amount and hence save the costs of going to trial.
In recent years a growing literature has focused on economic aspects of processes of argumentation, deliberation, opinion formation and group decisionmaking in general (e.g., Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005) , Gerardi and Yariv (2007) , Visser and Swank (2007) , List et al. (2013) , Dickson, Hafer, and Landa (2015) ). Our model builds on recent literature on Bayesian persuasion (stemming from Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) , which has typically focused on the attempts of one agent (a sender) to persuade another (a receiver or decisionmaker). The asymmetric setting where a sender tries to persuade a receiver is the predominant setup in the economic literature on persuasion (cf. the aforementioned Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011 but also, for a different model, Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001 , 2006 , 2012 , 2004 . We are not aware of studies of the symmetric setting we explore here, where parties act both as senders and receivers.
In our model, two parties exchange information about a particular event. They cannot lie but can introduce noise in the information they reveal in an attempt to induce the counterpart to misinterpret such information in a way more favorable to them. In other words a party may shade information in order to make it less informative to the other party. Persuasion critically depends on the parties' ability to shade. Quite realistically, we find that if a party's ability to shade is too great, the other party becomes too skeptical and persuasion fails. To persuade, parties must be able to shade but should not shade too much.
Information shading is so relevant in reality that it is explicitly prohibited in certain circumstances. For instance, the Brady rule 1 in the United States obliges prosecutors to disclose materially exculpatory evidence to the defense. Yet, there is no such obligation in private discussions and in negotiations. Only in some cases do contractual parties incur liability for failure to disclose information, while giving false information is generally punished (Kronman, 1978) .
The model applies to independent decisions. With independent decisions, the parties exchange arguments that are instrumental to making two different choices. A party might be interested in and derive utility from the decision taken by the other party, but the parties' decisions are independent actions. Political discussions and sports talk belong to this category, which can be referred to as opinion formation. The model, however, could be adapted to apply to joint decisions, where the parties' opinions after arguments are exchanged to determine a joint decision to, for instance, trade a good or settle a lawsuit.
2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model, which is analyzed and solved in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis and concludes.
2 The model
Setup
Consider two parties, a and b, who need to select one of two options γ i ∈ {A, B} (with i ∈ {a, b}) independently of each other. Either option may be the bestsuited-i.e., may be the one that correctly tracks the state of the world-θ ∈ {A, B}, but this is only imperfectly known to the parties. Parties have an objective preference for choosing the best option and an idiosyncratic preference for choosing the option they feel affinity with. All other things equal, a has an inclination towards A and b towards B. More precisely, a party receives a payoff equal to 1 if she chooses the best option, γ i = θ. She also receives an additional positive payoff v i , if the best option happens to be her preferred option. The same additional payoff accrues if the other chooses that option. Note that the parties receive 0 from choosing the wrong option. In particular, choosing the wrong option yields 0 even if this option is the party's favorite choice.
To illustrate, consider two entrepreneurs (a and b) who are about to invest in an innovative project. The project can be pursued using either of two technologies (γ i ) but it is not known ex ante which of the two technologies leads to a success. If the entrepreneur chooses the right technology (θ), the project succeeds, yielding profits equal to 1 (profits are 0 if the entrepreneur chooses the wrong technology). In addition, each entrepreneur has a comparative advantage with a different technology and earns an additional payoff v i -for instance, a fee for services provided to customers-every time that technology is adopted (including by the other entrepreneur) and is successful. The payoffs of this biased truth-tracking game are recapitulated in Table 1 .
Therefore, although party a prefers option A, he or she will choose B if it is clear that B is the best option. However, since θ is unknown, party a's choice 2 With respect to settlement negotiations, our approach contributes a novel reason why parties go to trial. Extant models focus either on divergent (irrational) priors (Shavell, 1982) , where parties simply do not exchange information and, hence, litigate because their initial priors are different, or on asymmetric information (Bebchuk, 1984; Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Spier, 1994) , where parties would like to exchange information but cannot credibly do so before trial. In contrast, in our model, parties can credibly exchange information prior to trial but choose not to do so in order to obtain a more favorable settlement. More generally, in our model, ex post asymmetric information does not result from an ex ante commitment problem (as in Akerlof, 1970) but from the parties' strategic decisions to withhold some information in order to induce persuasion and obtain a better outcome. Table 1 : Biased truth-tracking game. Nature chooses the left or the right matrix (i.e., the value of θ).
will be based on the probability that an option is the best, given the available information. Accordingly, party a's dominant strategy is to choose A if, and
where the left-hand side of the inequality is the expected difference in payoffs from choosing A as compared to choosing B and the right-hand side is the expected payoff from choosing B. Noting that Pr (θ = B | ·) = 1 − Pr (θ = A | ·), the inequality can be rewritten as
where 0 < t a < 1 2 can be thought of as a's idiosyncratic inclination for A (or a's ideological position), so that a chooses option A even when option B is more likely to be the (objectively) correct choice, that is, in cases where t a is less than Similarly, b's dominant strategy is to choose B if, and only if
, where the left-hand side is the expected payoff from choosing B and the right-hand side is the expected payoff from choosing A. As before, we can rewrite the inequality in a more convenient form as
where 1 2 < t b < 1. Intuitively, parties can be thought of preferring false positives to false negatives with respect to their own biases, or to suffer from a confirmation bias.
Signals
Parties base their decisions on the three following pieces of information:
, that is, it is more likely than not to be accurate although not perfectly accurate (full accuracy would make information exchange irrelevant). Note that Pr (s) = 1 2 (the prior). 3. A revealed signal r i ∈ {A, B} conveyed to party i by the other party. Such signal is a selective revelation of the sender's private signal. The idea is that a party can decide to withhold some evidence when revealing the signal, thereby reducing its quality. Selective revelation can be intuitively thought of as a form of "jamming" of the original private signal. If evidence is withheld, there is a probability that the other party will interpret the evidence in a different way, which is possibly more favorable to the sender than the original signal. Hence, let
describe the probability that the receiver j (with j = i) interprets the revealed signal r j in the same way as sender i interpreted the original signal s i . The boundary value p ∈ 1 2 , 1 captures the maximum level of "jamming" that the sender can choose. This limit can derive from some natural limitation on shading or from the law. It is worth stressing the following features of the above setup:
• The sender i chooses p A i and p B i but cannot decide r j directly. Intuitively, each party can only choose whether and how much to "jam" the original signal but cannot impose a particular interpretation of the same signal on the other party.
• The sender's choice is a continuous choice between p and 1.
• The receiver j observes r j but does not observe p 
The persuasion game
The model has four time steps:
1. At T 0 Nature chooses t a , t b , q, and p, which are common knowledge.
2. At T 1 each party learns his or her signal s i privately; the signals are independent random draws from the same conditional distribution described in Table 2. 3. At T 2 the parties simultaneously choose their revelation strategies, exchange signals r j and learn the signal revealed to them by the other party.
4. At T 3 the parties make their choices γ i ∈ {A, B}, that is they play the biased truth-tracking game (Table 1) based on the beliefs about θ they acquired at T 2 .
The action of the game takes place at T 2 when the parties strategically select the quality of the signal to transmit to the other party depending on the private signal they receive. The strategies are described in Table 3 above. A revelation strategy for party i is denoted
. We call this type of strategic interaction a mutual persuasion game.
3 It should be clear that such mutual persuasion game can be thought of as a Bayesian extensive form game with simultaneous and observable actions. We spell this out in detail in the Appendix. The analysis provided in the following sections studies a specific perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game, depending on the parameters t a , t b , q, and p.
Analysis
In this section, we first illustrate a benchmark case in which each party has direct access to the signal drawn by the other party. We then analyze parties' strategic interaction. We start we examining the parties' optimal choices at T 3 , and then use them to analyze their rational revelation strategies at T 2 . The key result we are after is the characterization of conditions under which a party's revelation results in successful persuasion.
Benchmark: sincere revelation
Let us first characterize the benchmark case where parties revel their signals sincerely (that is, we impose p Table 4 recapitulates the probabilities Pr(s a , s b | θ), which are easily derived from Table 2 .
Using Table 4 , we now turn to the probabilities Pr (θ | s a , s b ) of the state of the world given the two individual signals. This is obtained by repeated application of Bayes' rule, 4 and is given in Table 5 . Note that, given our assumption q < 1 2 , we have
Although the game is perfectly symmetric, given this information, party a 3 The term "persuasion game" is used also in Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) (cf. also the related work in Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) and Glazer and Rubinstein (2012) ) to refer to a different game, consisting of an extensive form strategic interaction where a speaker tries to convince a listener to take a specific action.
4 For instance: 
2 < t a ; she will still choose A if the latter condition is not satisfied, even though both signals indicate B. Similarly, party b will choose B more often than A. Here we see the parties' idiosyncratic preferences at work, absent any strategic interaction between them. Let us now turn to such strategic interaction.
Parties' optimal choices at T 3
Let us start with party a and characterize party a's optimal choice γ a at T 3 by identifying the conditions (as a function of a's private signal and of b's revealed signal) under which a particular choice maximizes a's expected utility.
• If s a = A, then party a chooses for A irrespective of b's revealed signal. This is the case because, as observed in the above benchmark analysis,
• If s a = B, then party a's choose depends on what a thinks b's signal is and this information can be inferred from the signal that b reveals to a. In particular, a will choose B, that is, will be convinced by b's revealed signal if Pr (θ = A | s a = B, r b ) ≤ t a . The latter can be written as follows:
where the first term is the probability that θ = A when s b = A times the probability that s b = A given the argument r b ; similarly, the second term is the probability that θ = A when s b = B times the probability that s b = B given the revealed signal r b . Equation (3) is party a's persuasion constraint, that is, the constraint that needs to be satisfied for a to be persuaded by b's revealed signal.
It is worth observing that, given the payoffs in Table 1 party a is strictly better of whenever party b chooses A.The same analysis applies mutatis mutandis to b.
Parties' revelation strategies at T 2
The choices made at time T 3 depend on the expectation a party has about the state of the world. These expectations depend in turn on the party's private signal and on the revealed signal she receives. So parties can influence each other's choices through their revealed signals at T 2 . We start from party b trying to convince party a to choose B. Party b wants to maximize the probability that party a chooses for B. To do so, party b needs to set up her revelation strategy
in such a way that party a will receive the signal r b = B as often as possible while still "believing" it (in a Bayesian sense). In other words, party b maximizes Pr (r b = B | s b ) subject to the persuasion constraint in (3) (solved below in (4)).
First of all, observe that, from Table 3 :
It follows that party b's optimal strategy to maximize these probabilities is:
• In other words: if b receives a signal s b = B, she will reveal to a all the evidence associated with that signal so hat a interprets the signal in the same way as b did. If instead b receives a signal s b = A, she will give a only part of the evidence in the hope that a will interpret it differently, that is, as a signal for B. The problem is that if p A b is set too low, evidence becomes unreliable and party a will not be swayed.
Therefore the quality p b of party b's revealed signal r b becomes:
The following is worth stressing. Party a does not observe p b directl y. If this were the case, party a could infer that s b = A by simply observing p b < 1. This is not possible since the quality of the signal is not observable. However, a will expect b to act strategically and hence will anticipate the value of p b and use it in calculating her expectations. A similar analysis applies to party a. 
Solving the persuasion constraint
To specify party b's strategy when s b = A recall that if party a has a private signal s a = A, he or she cannot be convinced, hence party b bases his or her strategy on the assumption that party a has a signal s a = B, which is the only case when r b may matter. This is important because, in order to set b's optimal strategy, we need to calculate Pr (s b | r b ) in (3), that is, party a's expectation of b's signal given b's revelation, which in turn depends on the conditional probability of s b given that a has observed s a = B.
Now recall equation (3). Our analysis of the benchmark case gave us exact values for P r (θ = A | s a = B, s b = A) = From Table 6 it is easy to see that, if party a observes r b = A, she can be certain that b's individual signal was A, irrespectively of s a . That is, we have Pr (s b = A | r b = A) = 1. The persuasion constraint in (3) is therefore not satisfied and, as expected, a will not be persuaded in this case.
If, instead, party a observes r b = B, then we need now to compute Pr (s b = A | s a = B, r b = B):
2 ) The first equality applies the definition of conditional probability. The second equality holds by multiplication of probabilities. The third equality assumes that a learns signal s a = B (i.e., it assumes that Pr(s a = B) = 1 in the numerator) and applies multiplication of probabilities in the denominator with the assumption that Pr(s a = B) = 1. The fourth equality expands the denominator summing the conditional probabilities conditioned on the two events s b = A and s b = B (under the condition s a = B). The fifth equality substitutes the values of table 6 in the expression. Finally, the sixth equality substitutes the values obtained via the two following series of equalities, which make use of the values of Table 2 :
More concisely, to obtain the persuasion value we first apply Bayes' rule to calculate the probability of s b conditional on s a = B (this is done from Table 2 and using 1 − q as the new prior for θ = A given the observation of s a = B). Then, this probability is used as distribution of s b in a second application of Bayes' rule. Now we can substitute the values obtained above and the values from Table  5 into a's persuasion constraint in (3), which becomes:
We now solve (4) for p A b to obtain the smallest value that satisfies (3):
b's persuasion value, and it denotes the minimum value of p A b that party a can accept. Since revelation strategies are not observable and we assume that neither party is able to commit to a particular revelation strategy, party a will expect b to shade up to the limit p. Therefore, party a will be persuaded if p A b < p and will not be persuaded otherwise. Therefore, we can distinguish between two cases: if p (1−q)q(1−2ta) . The intuition is that, in this region, institutions that prevent parties from shading too much (we may call them "mediators") have the effect of expanding the scope of persuasive interactions, allowing party a to rely more convincingly on representations made by b and vice versa. 
Results
We discuss here how the model predicts the two parties may choose at time T 3 given the individual signals obtained at time T 1 . Table 7 recapitulates the possible outcomes we discuss below. 
Unidirectional persuasion
If one party receives a private signal, which is in line with her private bias, but the other party does not (e.g., without loss of generality, s a = B and s b = B) then two outcomes are possible: 
Bidirectional persuasion-reversal of opinions
This is the interesting case in which both parties receive private signals that contradict their bias. The following outcomes result from the interaction: 
Conclusions
We have presented a model of Bayesian persuasion that describes the revelation strategies of two parties who try to persuade each other while also attempting to gauge useful information from the discussion. We show under what conditions a party will persuade the other and vice versa. At the core of our result is the simple observation that a party wants to persuade the other only when he or she anticipates that the information held by the other party can be safely disregarded. Since a party's revealed information is pivotal for the other party's decision only when the other party has concurrent information, parties take a relatively aggressive stand in persuasion and it is possible that both parties succeed in persuading the other. This framework applies both to independent decisions (which option to choose) and to joint decisions (whether to settle a case). We offer a novel explanation of why negotiations fail: parties might leave the negotiation table with divergent opinions because each of them has strategic incentives not to reveal all the information at his or her disposal to the other party. This might happen even if information is perfectly verifiable.
It is worth pointing to some natural classess of strategies. A fully biased strategy for agent i is the pure strategy (1, 1), accordint to which the agent reveals only signals, and chooses only, in accordance to her bias. An informative strategy is a strategy (r, c) where r = 1 if t i = I and r = 0 otherwise (with c arbitrary), that is a pure strategy in which the agent always reveals her signal sincerely. A truthful strategy is a strategy (r, c) where c = 1 iff P r(θ = I | t i , r −i ) > t i (with rarbitrary), that is i chooses for I iff she considers the likelihood of that state of the world larger than her threshold t i , given her individual signal and the signal revealed by −i. In the paper we studied strategies that were pure in their choice component c ∈ {0, 1} and mixed in their revelation component r, but with a lower bound pon mixing, that is, r ∈ (p, 1]. This class of strategies, to which we refer as strategies with pure choice and constrained mixed revelation, is the class upon which we focus in the paper. Within this class we signle out strategies of the following type: (r, c) where r = 1 if t i = I and r = 0 otherwise, and where c = 1 iff P r(θ = I | t i , r −i ) > t i . Let us such strategies p-informative and truthful.
Theorem 1. The strategy-belief pair ((σ a , σ b ), (µ a , µ b )) where σ i is p-informative and truthful (for i ∈ {a, b}), and µ i is such that, for any history h and α ∈ {A, B} 2 :
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in strategies with pure choice and constrained mixed revelation.
6 Intuitively, the formula expresses a consistency criterion between the action performed by i in history h and −i's belief about i's type at that history, given strategy σ i . The formula states that −i's belief about i's type at history hα is obtained through Bayesian update given −i's belief about i's type at history h and the action performed by i at history h given strategy σ i . In the persuasion game this reasoning is critical in the choice stage of the game (T 3 ) after the players have observed each other's revealed signal.
